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PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT'S ATTITUDE
TOWARD THE COURTS
CHARLES W SMITH, JR.*

In the years since Franklin D. Roosevelt became President
the American constitutional system has been undergoing a revolution. The exigencies of modern conditions have seemed to
make necessary some modification m the traditional relations between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of the
government, between the nation and the states, and between economic interests and the political sovereign.' The power of the
executive has grown. The power of the nation has been extended. The "no man's land" which the courts had erected to
insure the immunity of economic interests from the control of
the political sovereign has been swept away 2 The revolution
has been bigger than the ambit of President Roosevelt's power,
but he has given it dynamic leadership. He has been n a
position practically to remake the Supreme Court, whieh is
traditionally the authoritative interpreter of the Constitution.
His attitude toward the judiciary has been of basic importance
in his contribution to the methods of the revolution.
In the minds of many Americans the Constitution has come
to stand for the ultimate in political wisdom and the Supreme
Court is its guardian. Constitution and Court "are symbols of an
ancient sureness and a comforting stability "3 Franklin Roose* Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Kentucky
(1942-43), A. B., Park College, 1925; M. A., University of Michigan,
1928; Ph. D., University of Wisconsin, 1934; author of ROGER B. TANEY;

JACKSONIAN JuRIsT, University of North Carolina Press, 1936; PUBLIC
OPINION IN A DEMocRACY, Prentice-Hall, 1939, and with W V Holloway of GOVERNMENT AND PoLIcs IN ALABAmA, University Supply

Store, 1941.
'See Walton Hamilton, The Smoldering Constitutional Crszs

(January 18, 1943) 108 New Republic 73-76.
'For a discussion of the development of this no man's land see

JACKSON, TnE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY, 39-74.
'Max Lerner, Constitution and Court as Symbols (1937) 46 Yale

ROBERT H.

Law Journal 1290.
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velt revealed early in his political career that he did not think
of the Constitution as a bulwark of the status quo. Speaking m
favor of the League of Nations in 1919, he replied to arguments
that the League covenant would run contrary to the American
Constitution with the statement that the Constitution was a document "through which a team and horses can be driven on
every page." 4 In a campaign speech in 1920, when he was a
candidate for Vice President, he declared that the Constitution
was incomplete and always had been. Its success depended upon
its interpretation and its application to existing conditions by
human beings. "I think of government as a living thing," he
said, "and not just as a mass of written statutes.' '- Later, as
Governor of New York, he declared in a radio address that the
Constitution of the United States had "proved itself the most
marvelously elastic compilation of rules of government ever
written. "6 In his first presidential inaugural address he expressed a conviction that the Constitution was so simple and
practical that extraordinary needs could always be met "by
changes in emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential
form.'' 7 Toward the close of his first term as President, after
he had seen many of his cherished measures held unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court, he expressed his intention to continue
to march forward in the belief "that the Constitution is intended
to meet and to fit the amazing physical, economic and social requirements that confront us in this modern generation. " s
If this is the proper conception of the Constitution, judges
who interpret the Constitution as a static, or even conservative,
influence on the government are guilty at least of poor statesmanship or lack of vision. Of course one might assume that
'the courts know best, and accept their judgments as having a
kind of Olympian finality, regardless of one's own private
opinon of the Constitution and the constitutional. Roosevelt
never felt such a veneration for the courts.
Shortly before he took office as Governor of New York,
Roosevelt expressed a desire for reform m the procedure of
state courts, in an interview with a journalist. He criticized the
'The
New York Times, March 2, 1919, § 11, p. 1.
5
6

Ibid.October 28, 1920, p. 5.

March 2, 1930. 1 THE PuBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANxInM
D. ROOSEVELT, 570.
8SIbzcd.

15.
June 10, 1936. 5 Ibid. 200.
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law's delay, its complexity and its costliness. He said that he
intended to appoint a commission composed, not of lawyers
alone, but of able citizens in all walks of life to bring about a
reform of the system.9 In his first annual message to the legislature he suggested that the subject of legal procedure be given
careful study "by a body of citizens representing the bench, the
bar and laymen."' 1 When the legislature passed a bill providing for the creation of a body composed wholly of lawyers
he vetoed it. In his annual message to the legislature in 1930 he
renewed Ins recommendation for the creation of a mixed commission of laymen and lawyers. 1'
In an address to the New York City bar association Roosevelt discussed the need for court reform at some length and
explained why he considered the participation of laymen vitally
important. He suggested that lawyers as members of a learned
profession had been able to "invest their business with an almost
mystical attribute that forbids the laying of the hard hands of
common sense on the tlngs that they are doing." In his
opinion there was nothing "sacrosanct" in ordinary legal problems. The kind of thorough-going reform which he desired
would require a great amount of patient planning and labor,
he realized, and for the best results laymen must participate.
After calling attention to the layman's concern in court procedure he said, "Moreover, laymen have no vested interests,
except in unusual instances, in the administration of justice.
Moreover, the intelligent layman is able to cut through
cobwebs that in some way frustrate the efforts of the lawyers.' '12
Not all of Roosevelt's comments on the courts were adversely critical. In 1930 he condemned Republican disparagement of New York's courts as "reprehensible" and "cowardly"
and accused the Republicans of attempting "to break down the
confidence of the public in this bulwark of our civilization.' '3
Notwithstanding this spirited defense of the judiciary it is
obvious that Roosevelt, when he came to the presidency, did not
9

S. J. Woolf, The Governor-Elect Discusses His Big Task, The
New York Times, December 30, 1928, § IX, p. 3.
"January 2, 1929, 1 THE PuBLic PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF
FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT,
1 January
1,

86.
1930. Ibid. 88.

"'March 12, 1932. Ibid. 271-278.
1, 1930. Ibid. 435.

I'November
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have any particular awe or reverence for the courts.
interested in the practical administration of -ustice.

He was

The democratic landslide in the presidential election of
1932 was largely a result of the strong popular feeling generated
by the depression that began m 1929. President Roosevelt moved
swiftly into action with a program of New Deal legislation designed to deal with the economic and social problems that the
depression had thrown into sharp relief. Tins program departed from conventional standards of national government
action and its constitutionality could be sustained only by a
very liberal construction of the Constitution. Such a construction was not forthcoming. In spite of the political
upheaval of 1932, the Supreme Court continued to reflect a conservative economic and constitutional viewpoint. The Roosevelt
program attempted to subordinate economic power to political
authority The Court tried to prevent this subordination. The
result was a string of decisions holding important statutes unconstitutional. 14 At a time when progressive sentiment was
stronger than it had been for generations the Court was throwmg out New Deal measures, apparently with something like the
whole-souled satisfaction that John Marshall felt whenever he
was able to thwart President Thomas Jefferson.
As the Court's decisions followed one another with a regularity that established judicial negation as a policy, resentment
mounted in the ranks of the political leaders of the New Deal.
However, for the most part the New Dealers remained silent
for a long time. On a few occasions they spoke out. After the
NRA decision in 1935,15 President Roosevelt accused the Court
of interpreting the commerce clause of the Constitution m the
light of the "horse and buggy days" of 1789.16 Some time later,
the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Wallace, referred to an
action of the Supreme Court as "probably the greatest legalized
" United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1 (1936), Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U. S. 238 (1936), Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U. S.
513 (1936) Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 388 (1935), Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton R. Co., 295 U. S. 330 (1935), Schechter
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935), Louisville Joint Stock Land
Bank v. Radford, 295 U. S. 555 (1935).
"Schechter Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495.
'See "The Two Hundred and Ninth Press Conference. May 31,
1935." 4 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKIN D. ROOSEVELT,
200-222.
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steal in American history ""7 A conviction began to grow,
both in the New Deal high command and in some groups among
the public, that something should be done to blast away the
opposition of the Court. Writing later the President said, "Of
course I gave no consideration at all to the suggestion which
came from some quarters that we do nothing about it."is
In spite of a growing volume of adverse criticism of the
Court from political leaders in sympathy with the New Deal
program, no one knew just what was the attitude of the masses
of the people. Roosevelt was wary and doubtful of the political
expedience of rough treatment of the Court in 1935 and 1936.
Consequently proposals for curbing the power of the judiciary
were not allowed to become an important issue in the presidential
campaign of 1936.
After his re-election by an almost unprecedented majority,
President Roosevelt soon moved to deal with the problem of
judicial obstruction to his program. Different plans and suggestions had been coming to the White House for some time and
the President had talked with numerous individuals on the subject. Following his victory in the election, he settled down to
a process of elimination of the plans suggested. After discussing the issues and objectives with many people, he and the
Attorney General and the Solicitor General decided on the
specific step to be taken. 19 On February 5, 1937, he proposed
to Congress that the President be authorized to appoint an additional justice to the Supreme Court for each justice over
seventy who did not retire, with fifteen as the maximum size of
the court, and that he be allowed to appoint an additional judge
for every judge over seventy years of age in the lower courts
who did not retire.
This proposal aroused the vigorous opposition of various
powerful conservative and influential groups and individuals.
The American Bar Association polled the lawyers of the country
and revealed that they were overwhelmingly opposed to the
proposal. 2 o The President of the Association declared that
"The New York Times, January 29, 1936, p. 1.
June 3, 1941. Introduction to THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES
OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1937 volume, LXI.
"Ibid. LX, LXI. See also The New York Times, January 20,
1937, p. 9.
' 23 American Bar Association Journal, 271-277, 338-343, 381-388,
(1937).

KENTUCKY LAW JoURNAL.

President Roosevelt envisaged a "legislative form of government, with an executive veto, but without power in the courts
to restrain legislation under the Constitution." He was convinced that the plan would destroy popular respect for the Constitution "and fundamentally alter the theories of government
upon which we have heretofore proceeded.' '21
To Roosevelt the issue was whether or not the will of the
people as expressed in the elections of 1932, 1934, and 1936 was
to be carried out. As he saw it, the Supreme Court had been
blocking the will of the overwhelming majority of the American
people for twenty years. Its invalidation of the New Deal pro22
gram was simply the climax to a long period of obstruction.
The situation in 1937 was so critical that to permit the will of
the people to be thwarted indefinitely was dangerous. Democracy
had been discarded in other countries because it had failed for
the time being to meet human needs. Democracy had not yet
failed m the United States, but it had not fully succeeded, and
if the government could not meet the needs of the people for
security and economic freedom, there was grave danger that
ultimately it might be compelled to give way to some alien type
23
of government.
There had been some talk of seeking remedy through amendment of the Constitution. Roosevelt was opposed to this because he thought an amendment would take too long and
because it would still be subject to the interpretation of biased
judges who would read into it the same prejudices they had
read into the original Constitution. But he held also that there
was nothing wrong with the Constitution. If interpreted rightly,
it was an instrument of progress. 2 1 The trouble was with the
Supreme Court justices who had laid a "dead hand" on the
"program of progress." The Constitution must be saved from
the Court and the Court from itself. "We must find a way to
take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution it"Frederick H. Stinchfield, The Supreme Court Issue (1937) 23
American Bar Association Journal, 235, 236.
'Introduction to THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT, 1937 volume, xLvn.

"Ibid. XLiVr. See also Roosevelt's address of March 4, 1937,

115-116.
U

Ibid. Lxm. See -also Annual Message to Congress, January 6,

1937. 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS
639.

AND ADDRESSES Op

FRAwmIN D.

ROOSEVELT,
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self.''25 The trouble was not even with the Court as an institution. The trouble was with some of the men on the
2 6
Court.
The President's theory was that the American government
with its three branches was like a three horse team. The
people were in the driver's seat. There was work to be done
which the people wanted done. Two of the horses, the President and Congress, were pulling together to get the field
plowed. The Supreme Court by refusing to work with the
team was preventing the field from being plowed.
The Court
had not kept the place assigned to it in the American form of
government, but had set itself up as a "super-legislature" and
had blocked action by reading into the Constitution meanings
which were not there and had never been intended to be
27
there.
Apparently Roosevelt never had much doubt that the
people would eventually have their way In the course of the
1936 campaign he expressed a faith that future history would
show, as past history had repeatedly shown, that a return to
reactionary practices is always short lived. "Having tasted the
benefits of liberation, men and women do not for long forego
those benefits. "28 In his first annual message to Congress after
te election, he said, "it is not to be assumed that there will be
a prolonged failure to bring legislative and judicial action into
closer harmony ",29 Then, after the fight over his proposal to
enlarge the Court had ended, he declared in a Constitution Day
address that the Constitution was a layman's document and
every effort in the past to construe it as a lawyer's contract had
failed. "Whenever legalistic interpretation has clashed with
contemporary sense on great questions of broad national policy,
ultimately the people and the Congress have had their way "30
Although the fight to enlarge the Court was lost, that august
body changed its ways even before there was any change in
personnel. A distinguished English political scientist, writing
I March

9, 1937. THE PUBLIC

PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN

D. ROOSEVELT, 1937 volume, 126. See also Introduction, L.

Ibid. LnI=, 130.
-Ibd.,March 4, 1937, 115-116 and March 9, 1937, 124, 126.

"August 3, 1936. 5 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT,

281.

' January 6, 1937. Ibid. 639.
1 September 17, 1937. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND

LIN D. ROOSEVELT, 1937

volume, 361-365.
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when the fight had just ended, declared that it was not certain
that the President had been finally defeated. "For, in the first
place his pressure has secured for him a temporarily favourable
Court, and, in the second, he has struck so resounding a blow
at its prestige, as to make it certain that its next period of illiberal construction will evoke an uniense movement for the
1
drastic reorganization of its powers."
The President himself apparently was convinced that the
32
He convictory had been his. A lost battle had won a war.
domestic
sidered tins victory one of "the most important
33
achievements" of his first two terms in office.
A long range view, however, will probably lead to the belief
that the victory was only a temporary one. The President had
hoped to establish a method of providing for "a continuous and
recurrent addition of new blood, new vigor, new experience, and
new outlook," to the federal judiciary 34 In this he was defeated.
Robert H. Jackson, later to be appointed to the Supreme Court,
wrote in a book published in 1941 that the struggle had produced
"no permanent reconciliation between the principles of representative government and the opposing principle of judicial
authority " The end had been a truce between judicial authority
and the popular will winch might, or might not develop into
permanent peace. The Justices themselves had been left to
correct the errors of the Court. And Mr. Jackson pointed out
that tlhe efforts of previous liberal Presidents to reform the Court
by additions to its personnel had failed to work any permanent
35
change.
Although the fight to enlarge the Court was spectacular and
significant, President Roosevelt's attitude toward the federal
court system was revealed also in the nature of ins appointments to judgeships. In fact, the personnel of the courts
is so important that the kind of men appointed to the courts
might be said to be the basic criterion of any president's attitude
toward the courts.
I Harold J. Laski, The Constitution Under Strarn (October-

December, 1937) 8 Political Quarterly, 514.

June 24, 1938. THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANxLIN

D. ROOSEVELT, 1937 volume, 393.

"T Introduction. Ibid. XLVir.
4bid. LxIV.
I Robert H. Jackson,

vi-vuii.
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When President Hoover appointed Judge Benjamin N.
Cardozo to the Supreme Court of the United States in 1932,
Franklin D. Roosevelt issued a public statement expressing Ins
approval and saying, "I know of no jurist more learned in the
law, more liberal in its interpretation and more insistent that
simple justice keep step with the progress of civilization and the
bettering of the lot of the average individuals who make up
mankind." ' 36 Tns may be taken as Mr. Roosevelt's ideal for
judicial appointments. However, since he became President
he has not always lived up to that ideal in his appointments.
He would doubtless agree with Macinavelli's dictum, "for how
we live is so far removed from how we ought to live, that he
who abandons what is done for what ought to be done, will
rather learn to bring about ins own rum than ins preservation."
A survey of the Roosevelt appointments leaves no doubt
that politics has been an important factor in numerous instances.
We read, for example, that on January 4, 1936, Frank V Kelly,
Democratic leader of Brooklyn, lunched with President Roosevelt and recommended the appointment of Matthew T. Abruzzo
to be a district judge in New York, and that he conferred also
with Postmaster General Farley 37 A month later we read that
the President nominated Mr. Abruzzo for the position, and tins
news item says, "Mr. Abruzzo
is a borough-wide power
among tlhe Italian-American voters." 3 8 A presidential election
was just ahead.
In the middle of June, 1936, the President sent to the Senate
the names of two other appointees to federal district courts in
New York. These two appointments aroused a storm of protest, outside Democratic organization circles. The New York
Times editorially said. "It is painful to have to record that
the President has again treated important appointments to the
federal courts as if they were ordinary partisan spoils.
About all that has been made public regarding the qualification
of one of the nominees is that he has been politically active in
the Bronx, is a follower of Boss Flynn and a friend of Chairman
Farley. The other has been repeatedly in the Assembly and
the Senate at Albany, as a representative of Tammany, and Ins
appointment is reported to be agreeable to Boss Dooling, who,
T

The New York Times, February 16, 1932, p. 3.
Ibid. January 5, 1936, p. 22.
Ibid. February 4, 1936, p. 11.
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for various reasons, is supposed to be in need of placating by
the Democratic Administration.' ' 9 Strong protest against
these appointments came also from the New York City Bar Association and from the New York County Lawyers' Associa40
tion.
In 1939 Thomas G. Walker was nominated by President
Roosevelt to be a district court judge in New Jersey The news
item telling of his appointment said that Mr. Walker had been
favored for the position by M'iayor Frank Hague ever since the
vacancy occurred and it continued, "The Mayor journeyed
to Hyde Park not long ago when the President was there and
later was quoted as saying he would support Mr. Roosevelt for
a third term." '4 1 In the minds of those who donot approve of
Machiavellian standards in politics President Roosevelt's court
appointments reached bottom in 1942 when he sent to the Senate
for appointment to a district court the name of .Thomas F
Meaney, a Hague protege whom the Governor of New Jersey
referred to as "a pawn in the hands of the boss of Jersey
City "42
Not all of Roosevelt's judicial appointments have been made
for purely partisan political reasons. He has made some particularly good appointments to the Circuit Courts of Appeals, if
one uses the apparent legal qualifications of the appointee as a
standard of judgment. The appointment of Judge Walter E.
Treanor to the Circuit Court of Appeals for the seventh circuit,
in 1937, is an example. Judge Treanor was an able student of
the law who had been a member of the Supreme Court of Indiana and had previously been a member of the faculty of
Indiana Umversity's Law School. Law school deans have fared
reasonably well. Charles E. Clark, dean of the Yale Law School,
Herschel W Arant, dean of the Ohio State University Law
School and Calvert Magruder, vice dean of the Harvard Law
School, were appointed to Circuit Courts of Appeals in 1939,
and Herbert F Goodrich, dean of the Umversity of Pennsylvama
Law School was appointed in 1940. Arnstead M. Dobie, dean
of the University of Virginia Law School, was appointed a disIbid. June 17, 1936, p. 22.
"Ibid. June 19, 1936, p. 14.
"Ibid. December 21, 1939, p. 27.
"See Congressional Record for June 30, 1942 (77th Congress, 2d

Session, 5959, unbound issue).
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trict judge and a few months later appointed to a Circuit Court
of Appeals, in 1939. Wiley Rutledge, dean at the University of
Iowa, was appointed to the Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in 1939, and in 1943 elevated to the Supreme Court.
Thurman Arnold, one time dean at West Virginia University
and later professor of law at Yale University, was nominated
for the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia in 1943.
In the annual convention of the American Bar Association
m 1936, Judge Merrill E. Otis, of the Western District of Mssour, presented a paper in which he gave statistics indicating
that the men appointed to judicial office by President Roosevelt
were inferior in educational qualifications to those named by the
six preceding Presidents. His figures were for appointments of
circuit and district judges and were as follows -43
Appointees of

Theodore Roosevelt
William H. Taft
Woodrow Wilson
Warren G. Harding
Calvin Coolidge
Herbert Hoover

Franklin D. Roosevelt

College trained

College graduates

77.0%
77.0%

55.8%
55.8%

69.0%
69.0%

54.0%
54.8%

73.7%

52.4%
57.8%

66.6%
49.0%

25.5%

There is no statistical way by which the fitness of judges
can be measured, but statistics may give clues of more or less
value as to the general qualifications of a group of men. Age,
education and previous experience are inportant elements in the
background of a judicial appointee. A young man may be
more liberal in outlook than an old man, at any rate he will
probably be on the court longer. Other things being equal, a
man with previous experience as a judge would seem to be better
qualified than one without such experience. If a man has been
a member of Congress, his appointment to a federal court would
seem to be a political appointment.
At the beginning of 1943 there were fifty-six justices on the
United States courts of appeals, 44 and one hundred and eighty" Merrill E. Otis, Organzzed for Servtce, 61 Annual Report of the
American Bar Association 413-414 (1936). Commenting on these statistics, The New York Times suggested, editorially, that college training

was not an adequate criterion of a judge's fitness for office and pointed
out that a igh percentage of the federal judges who have been im-

peached were college graduates. The New York Times, August 25,

1936, p. 20.

" Including the courts for the ten circuits and the District of

Columbia.
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five judges of district courts in the United States proper
(including the District of Columbia) 45 Of these judges, thirty-

eight courts of appeals justices and one hundred district court
judges were appointed by President Roosevelt.
The following table gives information as to the age, education and experience of the Roosevelt appointees. 4 6
AGE, EDUCATION, AND EXPERIENCE OF
ROOSEVELT COURT APPOINTEES IN PERCENTAGES
District

Court of

District and

Court
Appointees

Appeals
Appointees

Appeals Court
Appointments

6.0
46.0
43.0
5.0

15.8
47.4
34.2
2.6

8.7
46.4
40.6
4.3

College graduates'7

38.0

50.0

41.3

Not college graduates
Information not available

52.0
10.0

47.4
2.6

50.7
8.0

25.0
64.0
11.0

44.7
52.6
2.6

30.4
60.9
8.7

13.0

10.5

12.3

75.0
12.0

86.8
2.6

78.3
9.4

Age at time of appontment
60 and over
50-59
49 and less
Information not available
Education

Previous 3udicial experience
Previously judges
Previously not judges
Information not available
Membership zi Congress
Previously members
of Congress
Previously not members
of Congress
Information not available

The table indicates that appointees to the courts of appeals
are better qualified by education and judicial experience than
appointees to the district courts. A smaller percent have been
members of Congress, which may indicate that the appointments
5
These numbers are from a list of judges furished by the Admmistrative Office of the United States Courts, January 15, 1943.
" Information was taken from various editions of THE WORLD
ALMANAC, WHO's WHO IN AMERICA, MARTINDALE-HUBBELL LAW

DIRECTORY, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, and THE NEW YORK Tnwus. I am
indebted to Mr. Kenneth E. Vanlandingham for help in gathering tins
information.
'" The term college graduate is used here to mean that the appointee
had a college degree other than a law degree.
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were less political. They were older men at the time of appointment. Excellent individual appointments to the Circuit
Courts of Appeals have already been mentioned. The appointees as a whole could hardly be called "old men," but, m
view of the President's emphasis on the undesirability of old
judges, it is a little surprising to find that almost nine percent
of his appointees have been sixty years old or older.
Roosevelt's appointments to the Supreme Court have been
made with an eye on political considerations and on the social
and economic views of the men appointed. His appointees have
been comparatively young men. Of the eight, Black, Reed,
Frankfurter, Douglas, Murphy, Byrnes, Jackson, and Rutledge,
only Byrnes was past sixty years of age at the time of his appointment. The others ranged in age from forty to fifty-six
years. Only Rutledge came to the Court with any previous experience as judge of an important court. Frankfurter had an
established reputation as an outstanding legal authority when
he was appointed. The appointments of Black, Murphy, Brynes,
and Jackson were the most political.
Political appointments are not necessarily bad ones. John
Marshall was a Federalist politician without any impressive
background of legal training when he was put on the Court,
but he was an able statesman and is generally considered the
greatest Chief Justice in the Court's history Roger B. Taney
was one of the ablest lawyers of his time, but he was appointed
to the Court because he was a trusted lieutenant of President
Jackson. Hugo Black was a political appointee of Roosevelt with
a legal background not much more impressive than John
Marshall's but he has already made an enviable record on the
Court and is quite likely to go down in history as one of the great
48
justices.
Although political appointees to the Supreme Court sometimes have been very good ones, no evidence is available to indicate that appointments to lesser courts made to please Senators
who want to pay off political debts or to please party bosses who
need patronage have ever turned out so well. President Roose11See Harold C. Havighurst, Mr Justice Black (June, 1938) 1
National Lawyers Guild Quarterly 181-185; Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.,
Mr. Justice Black and the Supreme Court (1940-1941) 8 Umversity of

Chicago Law Review 20-41; Richard F Green, Mr Justice Black
versus the Supreme Court (1939) 4 Umversity of Newark Law Review
113-148.
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velt's record in these matters betrays an attitude toward the
judiciary which could hardly be called one of reverence, and it
is not calculated to inspire reverence in the minds of others.
But Mr. Roosevelt was not the first to treat judicial appoint49
ments as partisan spoils.
A University of Michigan law professor wrote in 1931,
"District and circuit judgeships have come to be regarded as
jobs to be handed out at the behest of local party chiefs." 50
There is no convincing proof that the Roosevelt appointments to
the lower federal courts have been worse, or better, by any
standard, than the average appointments of other Presidents.
A clue to Mr. Roosevelt's attitude toward the courts, perhaps related to the nature of his appointments, is the readiness
he has shown to take men from the courts for appointments to
administrative positions. James F Byrnes resigned from the
Supreme Court, after having been on it only a little longer than
one year, to accept appointment as Director of Economic Stabilization. Robert P Patterson, who had been appointed to the
Circuit Court of Appeals by the President in 1939, was appointed Assistant Secretary of War in 1940. Francis Biddle,
who had been appointed to the Circuit Court of Appeals in 1939,
was made Solicitor General early in 1940. Such shifting of
men on and off high courts tends to make a judicial appointment
seem just like any other important government job.
It "certainly tends to dispel any aura of sacredness that may hover
around the courts in the minds of romantic conservatives.
Roosevelt's primary concern has been with policy rather
than administration. He has viewed the courts as merely one
part of the administrative machinery of government, and has not
been particularly concerned with them except when they blocked
his policies. To him courts are no more sacred than the other
branches of government. Judges are no more infallible than
other public officials and no more entitled to respect. The ideal
judge is a person learned in the law, with a broad and liberal
point of view. But practically the President must work with
"For a discussion of the political, personal, and other factors that
entered into the appointment of Supreme Court justices from 1853

to 1939 see J. P Frank, The Appointment of Supreme Court Justices
(1941) Wisconsin Law Review 172-210, 343-379, 461-512.
Burke Shartel, Federal Judges-Appontment, Supervision, and
Removal-Some Possibilities Under the Constitution (June, 1931)
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Senators and party bosses in order to obtain support for his
policies, therefore he will appoint to judgeships men recommended by these politicians without too much quibbling about
their qualifications just as he will appoint men to postmasterships or make them federal marshals for similar reasons. The
important thing is to get the work done. The will of the
people as expressed at the polls must be carried out.
In the development of constitutional law the Supreme Court
is much more important than the lesser courts, and the Supreme
Court since 1937 has pursued a policy of self-restraint. In this
period no act of Congress has been held unconstitutional. Roger
B. Taney, Jacksoman -jurist, Chief Justice a hundred years ago,
set the states free to deal with social and economic problems.
His philosophy was well expressed in his Charles River Bridge
decision, in the course of which he said. "But the object and
end of all government is to promote the happiness and prosperity of the community by which it is established, and it can
never be assumed, that the government intended to diminish its'
power of accomplishing the end for which it was created.''51
Now the Supreme Court has set the nation free. The majority
of the justices now accept Chief Justice Stone's idea that
"Courts are not the only agency of government that must be
assumed to have the capacity to govern.' '52 Franklin D. Roosevelt's attitude toward the courts as translated into his influence
on the American constitutional system has been that of a kind
of twentieth century Jacksomanism. 5 3
I Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 11 Peters 420, 547 (1837)
See also License Cases, 5 Howard 573 (1847).
States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 87 (1935) (dissenting opinion). 'United
ITis is not to imply that the justices on the Roosevelt constituted Court are always unammous in their decisions. For a discussion
of their recent voting records see C. Herman Pritchett, The Voting
Behavzor of the Supreme Court (1942) 4 Journal of Politics 491-506.

